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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of job insecurity on labour supply. We 
propose a discrete choice model of labour supply, in which the choice alternatives 
are characterised by bundles of income, hours of work and job insecurity. The 
results show that job insecurity has a negative and significant effect on individuals’ 
utility. Moreover, once job insecurity is included in the discrete choice alternatives, 
the predictive power of the model improves significantly. Labour supply elasticities 
are significantly higher than those obtained with a traditional model and increase 
with the level of job insecurity. Finally, a decrease of job insecurity at work has a 
positive and significant effect on participation. Policies aimed at improving working 
conditions could, in this sense, be useful to create incentives in labour market. 
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1. Introduction 
A	considerable	body	of	research	has	documented	the	importance	of	job	insecurity	as	
a	work	domain.	At	the	individual	 level,	 job	insecurity	has	been	found	to	negatively	
affect	job	satisfaction	(Clark,	2010;	De	Witte,	2005;	Hellgreen,	et al.	1999),	as	well	
as	 physical	 and	 mental	 health	 (Burgard	 et al.	 2009;	 De	Witte,	 1999;	 Dekker	 and	
Schaufeli,	 1995;	 Ferrie,	 1998).	 At	 the	 organisational	 level,	 job	 insecurity	 has	 been	
shown	to	be	related	with	higher	absenteeism	(Chirumbolo	and	Areni,	2005;	Probst,	
2002),	higher	turnover	and	quit	intentions	(Clark,	2001;	Dekker	and	Schaufeli,	1995)	
and	less	organisational	commitment	(Hellgreen,	et al.	1999;	Lord	and	Hartley,	1998;	
Rosenblatt,	et al.	1999).	However,	the	effect	of	job	insecurity	at	a	more	aggregate	level	
has	been	 less	considered	 in	 the	 literature.	 In	 this	article,	we	study	 the	effect	of	 job	
insecurity	on	labour	supply.	In	particular,	we	extend	traditional	discrete	choice	models	
of	labour	supply	to	incorporate	job	insecurity	in	the	choice	alternatives	and	compare	
the	estimated	labour	supply	responses	to	those	of	a	model	where	only	a	discrete	hours’	
set	characterises	job	alternatives.	
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Discrete	choice	models	of	labour	supply	have	become	increasingly	popular	as	
they	facilitate	dealing	with	non-linear	and	non-convex	budget	sets	as	well	as	accounting	
for	multiple	goods	in	the	utility	function,	compared	to	the	traditional	approach	based	
on	 a	 continuous	 set	 of	 hours.	 The	 idea	 behind	 the	 discrete	 choice	 approach	 is	 to	
define	a	finite	number	of	working	hours’	alternatives	and	to	explicitly	specify	a	utility	
function	characterising	the	individual’s	utility	at	each	of	the	alternatives	of	the	discrete	
hours	set.	The	estimation	of	the	discrete	choice	model	provides	directly	the	parameters	
defining	the	shape	of	the	utility	function.	
Most	 studies,	 using	 the	 discrete	 labour	 supply	 approach,	 take	 income	 and	
hours	of	work	as	the	only	choice	variables	affecting	individuals’	decisions.	However,	
we	agree	with	Dagsvik	and	Strøm	(2006)	that	‘hours	of	work	and	income	are	only	two	
out	of	several	job	related	attributes,	which	are	important	for	individual	behaviour	in	
the	labour	market’.	Dagsvik	(1994)	and	Dagsvik	and	Strøm	(1992)	propose	a	model	of	
labour	supply	which	accounts	for	the	importance	of	qualitative	factors	of	jobs.	This	
model	of	discrete	choice	labour	supply	assumes	that	the	alternatives	are	characterised	
by	‘job	packages’	which	are	defined	by	a	bundle	of	hours	of	work,	wage	rates	and	other	
non-pecuniary	job	attributes.	Other	studies	on	labour	supply	such	as	Aaberge,	Dagsvik	
and	Strøm	(1995),	Aaberge	and	Colombino	(2013)	and	Dagsvik	and	Strøm	(2006)	use	
a	similar	methodology.	Dagsvik	and	Strøm	(2006)	introduce,	for	instance,	job	sector	
(public	or	private	sector)	in	their	analysis,	assuming	that	jobs	in	different	sectors	may	
differ	in	terms	of	non-pecuniary	attributes.	In	a	recent	paper,	Kunze	and	Suppa	(2013)	
investigate	the	effect	of	 introducing	job	characteristics	 in	discrete	choice	models	of	
labour	 supply.	However,	 alternatives	 are	 defined	 only	 over	 discrete	 hours’	 choices,	
while	 job	 characteristics	 enter	 the	 utility	 function	 through	 interactions	 between	
income	and	leisure.	Contrary	to	Kunze	and	Suppa	(2013),	in	this	paper,	we	propose	
an	 extended	discrete	 choice	model,	where	 the	 choice	 alternatives	 are	 characterised	
by	bundles	of	 income,	hours	of	work	and	 job	 insecurity	 in	order	 to	allow	for	more	
flexibility	in	the	choices	available	to	individuals	and	to	analyse	the	effect	of	changes	in	
job	insecurity	on	labour	supply	decisions.	
Our	contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 is	 twofold.	First,	we	provide	an	extension	
of	discrete	choice	labour	supply	models	in	order	to	allow	for	the	introduction	of	non-
pecuniary	job	attributes	in	the	analysis,	 in	our	case	job	insecurity.	We	analyse	how	
such	extension	affects	labour	supply	elasticities.	Second,	we	complement	the	literature	
on	the	consequences	of	job	insecurity.	In	particular,	we	show	that	job	insecurity	has	
a	 significant	 effect	on	 labour	 supply	decisions,	which	could	be	of	 interest	 in	 terms	
of	labour	market	policies	based	on	non-monetary	incentives.	The	paper	is	structured	
as	follows.	Section	2	briefly	discussed	the	nature	of	job	insecurity	as	a	job	attribute.	
Section	3	presents	the	discrete	choice	models	to	be	used	in	our	labour	supply	analysis.	
First,	we	present	the	traditional	labour	supply	model	where	only	hours	of	work	define	
the	choice	set.	Then,	the	extended	conditional	logit	is	introduced	in	order	to	allow	the	
choice	set	to	be	characterised	by	bundles	of	income,	hours	of	work	and	job	insecurity.	
Section	4	describes	the	data	and	presents	some	summary	statistics.	Section	5	presents	
the	 estimates	 of	 the	 structural	 labour	 supply	 models.	 Section	 6	 discusses	 labour	
responses	in	terms	of	wage	elasticities	and	changes	in	the	predicted	probabilities	from	
a	decrease	of	job	insecurity.	Finally,	section	7	concludes.	
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2. Job Insecurity as a Job Attribute 
Jobs	are	characterised	by	multiple	attributes,	which	might	affect	individuals’	labour	
supply	decisions.	In	this	paper,	we	focus	on	job	insecurity,	which	has	been	considered	
one	of	 the	most	 important	domains	at	work	 (Clark,	2001	and	2010).	Moreover,	 job	
insecurity	has	proved	to	significantly	affect	important	individuals’	outcomes	such	as	
well-being	(Clark,	2001	and	2010;	Green,	et al.	2013),	health	(Burgard,	et al.	2009;	
Ferrie,	 1998)	 and	 organizational	 commitment	 (Hellgreen,	 et al.	 1999;	 Lord	 and	
Hartley,	1998;	Rosenblatt,	et al.	1999).		
According	to	Greenhalgh	and	Rosenblatt	(1984)	job	insecurity	is	defined	as	
the	perceived	powerlessness	to	maintain	the	desired	job	continuity.	The	idea	that	job	
insecurity	refers	to	individuals’	perception	of	their	job	situation	highlights	the	fact	that	
both	a	subjective	and	an	objective	component	characterise	this	concept.	Individuals	
evaluate	their	level	of	job	insecurity	based	on	objective	information	from	their	jobs.	
Studies	 have	 shown	 that	 perceived	 job	 insecurity	 provides	 reliable	 information	
about	 objective	 indicators	 of	 insecure	 jobs.	 In	 particular,	 perceived	 job	 insecurity	
is	significantly	associated	with	temporary	employment	and	job	sector;	public	sector	
being	considered	more	secure	than	the	private	sector	(Campbell,	et al.	2007;	Clark	and	
Postel-Vinay,	2009;	Deloffre	and	Rioux,	2003;	Näswall	and	De	Witte,	2003).	Moreover,	
perceived	job	insecurity	has	proved	to	be	a	good	predictor	of	future	unemployment	
experiences	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 observed	 objective	 variables,	 implying	 that	
self-perceived	job	insecurity	contains	useful	private	information	about	jobs,	which	is	
otherwise	not	directly	available	in	surveys	(Campbell,	et al.	2007;	Deloffre	and	Rioux,	
2003).	In	fact,	restructuration	such	as	privatization	of	formerly	public	companies,	as	
well	as	layoffs	have	been	shown	to	increase	self-perceived	job	insecurity	(Ferrie,	et al.	
1995;	Nelson,	et al.	1995).		
The	 particular	 interpretation	 of	 job	 insecurity	 information	 is	 moreover	
linked	to	the	formulation	of	the	questions	included	in	surveys.	At	least	three	different	
formulations	are	used	in	surveys,	which	are	related	to	feelings	of	insecurity	(‘Do	you	
feel	your	job	is	secure?’),	satisfaction	with	job	insecurity	(‘How	satisfied	are	you	with	
your	job	security?’)	and	the	probability	of	losing	a	job	(‘What	is	the	probability	that	
you	lose	your	job	in	the	next	(e.g.	12	months?’).	Note	that	the	first	two	formulations,	in	
particular,	confound	two	components	of	job	insecurity	discussed	in	the	literature:	the	
probability	of	job	loss	and	the	cost	of	job	loss	(Campbell,	et al.	2007).	The	variables	
related	to	these	three	types	of	questions	are	however	highly	correlated	and	all	three	
are	significantly	associated	with	objective	indicators	of	insecure	jobs.	Nevertheless,	it	
is	important	to	keep	in	mind	which	type	of	information	is	available	when	interpreting	
the	results.		
While	 acknowledging	 the	 particularities	 related	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 job	
insecurity,	 in	 this	 paper	we	consider	 it	 as	 a	proxy	 for	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	objective	
insecurity	characterising	a	job.	Throughout	our	analysis,	we	discuss	the	implications	
of	such	assumption	given	the	type	of	information	available	in	the	British	Household	
Panel	Survey	(BHPS)	used	in	our	study.	
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3. Discrete Choice Models of Labour Supply 
Discrete	 choice	 models	 of	 labour	 supply	 are	 particularly	 popular	 in	 the	 framework	
of	behavioural	microsimulation	of	 tax	and	benefit	reforms.	In	fact,	many	policies	are	
specifically	 aimed	 at	 encouraging	 labour	 market	 participation	 of	 certain	 population	
groups.	For	instance,	Brewer,	et al.	(2007)	use	a	structural	model	of	labour	supply	in	order	
to	evaluate	the	effect	of	the	Working	Families	Tax	Credit	on	labour	market	participation	
in	the	UK.	Moreover,	other	tax	and	benefit	reforms	might	also	affect	individuals’	labour	
supply	behaviour,	which	needs	to	be	taken	into	account	when	evaluating	the	effect	of	
such	policies	on	different	outcome	variables,	such	as	poverty	or	inequality.	
In	this	section	we	describe	the	model	most	widely	used	to	estimate	discrete	
choice	 labour	 supply,	 namely	 the	 conditional	 logit	 model.	 The	 model	 is	 derived	
under	the	assumption	of	utility	maximisation.	Consider	individual	 i	chooses	among	
a	finite	 number	 of	 job	 alternatives,	 J.	 The	 utility	 obtained	 from	alternative	 j	 is	U
ij
,	
j =	1,…,J.	Individual	i	chooses	alternative	j	if	and	only	if	U
ij 
>U
ik
,	∀k ≠	j.	The	utility	
function	can	be	decomposed	in	a	deterministic	and	a	stochastic	component:	U
ij 
=	V
ij 
+	e
ij
,	where	the	distribution	of	the	random	vector	e
i 
={e
i1
,…,e
iJ
}	is	given	by	F(e
i
).	The	
probability	that	a	particular	alternative	j	is	chosen	is:
P
ij 
=	Prob(U
ij 
>U
ik
,	∀k ≠	j)
	 =	Prob(V
ij 
+	e
ij  
>	V
ik 
+	e
ik
,	∀k ≠	j)
	 =	Prob(e
ik 
<	e
ij  
+	V
ij
−	V
ik
,	∀k ≠	j)	
	
Depending	on	the	specification	of	 the	distribution	of	 the	random	component,	
different	discrete	choice	models	can	be	obtained.	The	conditional	logit	model	is	obtained	
assuming	that	the	stochastic	component,	e
ij
,	is	independent	and	identically	distributed	
over	alternatives	and	follows	a	type-one	extreme	value	distribution,	given	by:	
	
F(e
i
)	=	e−e−eij
	
Under	the	conditional	logit	setup,	the	probability	that	alternative	j	is	chosen	is	
given	by	(McFadden,	1974):	
P
ij 
=	Prob(e
ik 
<	e
ij  
+	V
ij
−	V
ik
,	∀k ≠	j)
	 =	∑J
k=1
	eVik
	
In	 our	 basic	model,	 individuals	 choose	 among	 a	 finite	 number	 of	working	
hours	alternatives	in	order	to	maximise	their	utility,	defined	over	net	income	and	hours	
of	work.	We	assume	that	the	gross	wage	rates	are	fixed	and	independent	of	the	hours	of	
work.	The	decision	is	taken	given	the	gross	wage	rates	and	the	tax	and	benefit	system.	
More	formally,	let	h
i
	be	the	number	of	hours	worked	by	individual	i.	We	define	
J	 discrete	 hours	 alternatives	 so	 that	 h
ij
	 represents	 the	 number	 of	 hours	worked	 by	
individual	i	under	alternative	j,	with	j =	1,…,J.	In	our	basic	model,	four	alternatives	
are	defined,	J =	4:	inactivity,	part-time,	full-time,	overtime.	Let	y
ij
	be	individual	i’s	net	
income	given	the	hours	choice	h
ij
	and	x
i
	a	vector	of	individual	characteristics.	The	net	
income	y
ij
,	when	h
i 
=	h
ij
	is	chosen,	is	defined	as:
	
eVij
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y
ij 
=	w
i 
h
ij 
+	m
i 
+	G(w
i
,	h
ij
,	m
i
,	x
i
)	,	
	
where	 w
i
	 are	 gross	 hourly	 wage	 rates,	 m
i
	 is	 non-labour	 income	 and	 the	 function
G(w
i
,	h
ij
,	m
i
,	x
i
)	represents	the	tax-benefit	rules	which	depend	on	gross	wages,	hours	of	
work,	non-labour	income	and	individual	characteristics.	Several	functional	forms	can	
be	used	to	specify	the	deterministic	part	of	the	utility	function.	Following	Keane	and	
Moffitt	(1998)	and	Brewer	et al.	(2007),	we	define	it	as	a	second	order	polynomial.	
In	our	basic	conditional	logit	model,	the	deterministic	part	of	the	utility	function	is	
given	by:	
V(y
ij
,	h
ij
,	x
i
)	=	a
yy 
y2
ij  
+	a
hh
h2
ij  
+	a
yh 
y
ij  
h
ij 
+	a
y 
y
ij  
+	a
h
(x
i
)h
ij 
,	
	
where	we	account	for	observed	heterogeneity	in	preferences	for	hours	of	work	through	
interactions	with	personal	characteristics:	
a
h
(x
i
)	=	a
h0	
+	a′
hx 
x
i
	
	
In	our	extended	model,	 job	insecurity	 is	 introduced	as	a	non-pecuniary	job	
attribute	affecting	labour	supply.	Three	job	insecurity	levels	are	defined	characterising	
low,	middle	and	high	job	insecurity.	A	total	of	ten	alternatives	are	available	representing	
inactivity	and	combinations	of	hours	of	work	and	job	insecurity	levels.	More	formally,	
let	 s
ij
,	 represent	 the	 level	 of	 job	 insecurity	 of	 individual	 i	 under	 alternative	 j.	 The	
deterministic	part	of	the	utility	function,	in	our	extended	model	is	given	by:	
V(y
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,	h
ij
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i
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+	a
h
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+	a
s
(x
i
)s
ij 
,	
	
where	we	 allow	 for	 observed	 preferences	 heterogeneity	 for	 hours	 of	work	 and	 job	
insecurity:	
a
h
(x
i
)	=	a
h0	
+	a′
hx 
x
i
a
s
(x
i
)	=	a
s0	
+	a′
sx 
x
i
		
Unobserved	 heterogeneity	 in	 preferences	 could	 also	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	
introducing	 random	 terms	 in	 a
h
(x
i
)	 and	 a
s
(x
i
)	 (see,	 Train,	 1998	 and	 Train,	 2003).	
However,	 in	 our	 empirical	 analysis,	 unobserved	heterogeneity	 in	 preferences	 is	 not	
accounted	for	given	the	small	size	of	our	sample.	The	sample	likelihood	function	for	
the	conditional	logit	model	is	given	by:	
	
L =	∏	∏	[Pij(yij,	hij,	xi)]dij	
	
where	d
ij
	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	individual	i	chooses	alternative	j	and	zero	otherwise.	
Note	that	in	order	to	construct	the	discrete	choice	alternatives	in	labour	supply	
N
i = 1
J
j = 1
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models	it	is	usually	assumed	that	gross	hourly	wages	are	fixed	and	independent	of	hours	
of	work.1	While	independence	between	wages	and	hours	of	work	is	generally	accepted	
in	 the	 structural	 labour	 supply	 literature,	 in	 our	 extended	 models	 the	 relationship	
between	wages	and	job	insecurity	deserves	more	attention.	In	fact,	if	job	insecurity	
is	considered	a	disamenity	some	sort	of	compensating	wage	differentials	might	exist	
for	 jobs	with	 higher	 insecurity,	which	would	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 our	
labour	supply	model.2	For	instance,	consider	an	individual	currently	in	a	job	with	low	
job	 insecurity,	 in	order	 to	construct	all	her	possible	choice	alternatives,	we	need	 to	
define	what	would	be	her	wage	under	the	alternative	of	middle	and	high	insecurity.	In	
this	study,	we	take	into	account	the	relationship	between	wages	and	job	insecurity	by	
randomly	assigning	wages	by	education	groups	from	the	wage	distribution,	as	will	be	
explained	in	section	4.	
	
4. Data 
Our	analysis	uses	data	from	wave	ten	of	the	British	Household	Panel	Survey	containing	
information	for	years	2000	and	2001.	The	BHPS	is	a	nationally	representative	survey	
for	the	United	Kingdom,	which	provides	information	about	individual	and	household	
characteristics,	wages,	 other	 income	 sources	 and	working	 conditions.	We	 limit	 our	
analysis	 to	wave	 ten	of	 the	BHPS	because	of	 the	need	of	developing	a	detailed	 tax	
and	benefit	microsimulation	model	to	calculate	disposable	income	for	each	discrete	
hour	alternative.	Our	microsimulation	model	 is	based	on	EUROMOD	version	21A,	
which	simulates	tax-benefit	rules	for	the	UK	in	2001	(see,	Sutherland	and	Gutierrez,	
2004).	Wave	ten	of	 the	BHPS	contains	15,603	individuals,	however,	we	restrict	our	
analysis	to	single	females,	who	gave	full	interview.	This	restriction	is	made	for	two	
reasons.	First,	focusing	on	single	individuals	enables	us	to	neglect	interactions	within	
the	household	in	the	context	of	labour	supply.	Second,	the	sample	of	single	males	is	
too	small	for	the	estimation	of	the	models	and	a	joint	estimation	of	males	and	females	
might	bias	 the	results	for	women.	As	it	 is	usually	done	in	 the	 literature,	we	further	
exclude	 individuals	 in	 self-employment	 because	 their	 labour	 supply	 decisions	may	
differ	considerably	from	those	of	salaried	workers	and	their	income	information	from	
surveys	is	considered	less	reliable	than	for	employees.	Disabled	individuals,	full-time	
students	 and	 pensioners	 are	 also	 excluded	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 only	 those	 individuals	
available	for	the	labour	market.	This	leaves	us	with	a	sample	of	750	females.	
Before	restricting	our	analysis	to	our	sample	of	interest	we	need	to	treat	the	
problem	of	non-observed	wages	for	non-workers.	We	do	this	by	estimating	a	two-step	
Heckman	selection	model	for	women,	using	the	whole	sample	of	females	(N=8,035).	
The	wage	equation	depends	on	variables	 related	 to	human	capital,	 such	as	age	and	
education	as	well	as	region	dummies	to	control	for	differences	in	labour	markets.	The	
selection	equation	is	based	on	the	usual	exclusion	restrictions	for	identification	where,	
in	additional	to	the	previous,	non-labour	income,	being	married	and	having	children	
of	different	ages	are	included	as	variables	(see,	Van	Soest,	1995;	Haan,	2010;	Bargain,	
et al.	2014).	The	results	of	the	estimation	are	shown	in	table	1.	
	1	 Some	 exceptions	 are	 studies	 by	 Aaberge	 and	 co-authors.	 See,	 for	 instance,	 Aaberge	 and	
Colombino	(2013).	
2	For	a	discussion	about	compensating	wage	differentials	see,	Rosen	(1987).
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Table 1 - Heckman Selection Model for Females
 coef. st. error
log hourly wage equation
age	 0.0590	***	 (0.0037)
age²	 -0.0007	***	 (4.82e-5)
cse	 0.146	***	 (0.0321)
o-levels	 0.224	***	 (0.0253)
a-levels	 0.340	***	 (0.0285)
higher	degree	 0.455	***	 (0.0251)
university	degree	 0.818	***	 (0.0284)
constant	 0.368	***	 (0.0787)
selection equation
age	 0.148	***	 (0.0073)
age²	 -0.002	***	 (8.61e-5)
cse	 0.203	***	 (0.0682)
o-level	 0.442	***	 (0.0537)
a-level	 0.437	***	 (0.0637)
higher	degree	 0.601	***	 (0.053)
university	degree	 0.573	***	 (0.0655)
non-labour	income	 -0.0014	***	 (6.28e-5)
married	 -0.188	***	 (0.0414)
child	(0-2)	 -0.464	***	 (0.0613)
child	(3-4)	 -0.381	***	 (0.0614)
child	(5-11)	 -0.183	***	 (0.0436)
child	(12-15)	 -0.0334		 (0.0456)
constant	 -1.911	***	 (0.152)
lambda	 0.0729	***	 (0.0254)
Observations	 8,035
Note:	Region	dummies	included	in	the	wage	and	selection	Equations.
	
		Most	variables	present	the	expected	signs,	both	in	the	selection	and	in	the	
wage	equations.	In	particular,	wages	and	the	probability	of	participation	increase	with	
age	at	a	decreasing	rate.	The	higher	the	level	of	education,	the	higher	the	probability	
of	participation	and	the	higher	the	wage.	Being	married	decreases	the	probability	of	
participation	for	women,	as	expected.	Participation	is	lower	with	the	presence	of	young	
children	in	the	household	and	these	effects	are	significant.	Non-labour	income	has	the	
expected	negative	and	significant	effect	on	participation.	Finally,	 the	coefficient	 for	
the	inverse	Mill’s	ratio	(lambda)	is	positive	and	significant,	implying	a	selectivity	and	
therefore	that	the	observed	wages	are	higher	than	the	wage	offers	of	a	random	sample.	
Using	the	results	obtained	from	the	Heckman	selection	model,	gross	hourly	
wages	 are	 imputed	 for	 non-workers.	 Once	 the	 information	 on	 gross	 hourly	 wages	
is	available	for	all	 individuals,	we	need	to	calculate	the	disposable	income	for	each	
discrete	hour	alternative.	As	previously	mentioned,	disposable	 income	 is	calculated	
using	 our	 own	 tax	 and	 benefit	 microsimulation	 model	 for	 the	 BHPS,	 based	 on	
EUROMOD	version	21A.	Eleven	tax	and	benefit	rules	are	simulated:	minimum	wage,	
national	insurance	employee	contributions,	contributory	job	seekers	allowance,	winter	
fuel	allowance,	income	tax,	children’s	tax	credit,	child	benefit,	working	families	tax	
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credit,	income	support,	housing	benefit	and	council	tax	benefit.	Other	benefits	are	not	
simulated	but	are	included	in	the	calculation	of	disposable	income.3	
Consider	 now	 the	 distribution	 of	 weekly	 hours	 of	 women	 in	 our	 sample,	
presented	 in	 figure	 1.	 Important	 peaks	 are	 observed	 for	 inactivity	 and	 full-time	
work	(around	40	hours	per	week),	as	well	as	a	small	peak	for	part-time	work	(around	
20	 hours	 per	 week).	 Taking	 this	 into	 consideration,	 we	 define	 four	 discrete	 hours	
points,	characterising	inactivity,	part-time	work,	full-time	work	and	overtime	work:	
h={0,20,40,55}	 which	 correspond	 to	 the	 intervals	 {0−5,6−34,35−45,>45}.	 These	
discrete	hours	points	represent	the	set	of	alternatives	in	our	basic	model.	
	
Figure 1 - Distribution of Female Weekly Hours of Work
	
In	the	extended	model,	job	insecurity	is	used	as	a	non-pecuniary	job	attribute	
to	be	included	in	the	job	choice	bundle.	The	BHPS	provides	information	concerning	
satisfaction	with	job	security	at	work.	Job	security	takes	values	between	1	and	7	with	
1	 representing	 that	 the	 individual	 is	 ‘not	 satisfied	 at	 all’	with	 job	 security	 at	work	
and	7,	that	the	individual	is	‘completely	satisfied’.	As	discussed	in	section	2,	despite	
the	subjective	nature	of	this	variable	self-perceived	job	insecurity	is	associated	with	
objective	 indicators	 of	 insecure	 jobs,	 such	 as	 temporary	 contracts	 (Campbell	et al.	
2007;	Clark	and	Postel-Vinay,	2009;	Deloffre	and	Rioux,	2003;	Näswall	and	De	Witte,	
2003).	 Moreover,	 satisfaction	 with	 job	 insecurity	 is	 correlated	 with	 other	 type	 of	
information	about	self-perceived	job	insecurity,	such	as	the	likelihood	of	becoming	
unemployed.	 For	 our	 extended	 labour	 supply	 model,	 we	 generate	 a	 job	 insecurity	
variable	 taking	values	2,	4	and	6,	where	2	represents	‘low	job	 insecurity’	(values	5	
to	7	from	the	original	variable;	satisfied	with	job	security),	4	represents	‘middle	job	
3	A	detailed	description	of	the	tax	and	benefit	microsimulation	model	for	the	BHPS	can	be	made	
available	on	request	from	the	author.	
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insecurity’	(value	4	from	the	original	variable;	neither	satisfied	nor	dissatisfied)	and	
6	‘high	job	insecurity’	(values	1	to	3	from	the	original	variable;	dissatisfied	with	job	
security).	By	regrouping	the	original	values	in	such	way,	we	expect	to	capture	better	
those	individuals	in	insecure	jobs	(those	dissatisfied	with	their	job	security)	and	at	the	
same	time	this	allows	us	to	save	computational	time	by	reducing	the	number	of	choice	
alternatives.	Ten	 discrete	 choice	 alternatives	 are	 therefore	 defined	 for	 the	 extended	
model,	representing	bundles	of	hours	of	work	and	job	insecurity:	(hours, insecurity),	
where	hours =	 {0,20,40,55}	 and	 insecurity =	 {2,4,6}.4	Descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	
variables	used	in	our	labour	supply	model	are	presented	in	table	2.		
	
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics of the Labour Supply Sample
 mean std. dev.
Net	income	(£	per	week)	 250.41	 113.75
Hours	of	work	(per	week)	 21.86	 16.93
Age	 37.71	 10.57
No	qualification	 0.179	 0.383
Certificate	of	Secondary	Education	(CSE)	 0.095	 0.293
O-levels	 0.207	 0.405
A-levels	 0.097	 0.297
Higher	degree	 0.279	 0.449
University	degree	 0.144	 0.351
Children	aged	0-2	 0.065	 0.247
Children	aged	3-4	 0.103	 0.304
Children	aged	5-11	 0.333	 0.472
Children	aged	12-18	 0.256	 0.437
Job	insecurity	 2.651	 1.392
low	job	insecurity	(2)	 0.579	 0.494
mid.	job	insecurity	(4)	 0.044	 0.205
high	job	insecurity	(6)	 0.095	 0.293
Number	of	observations	 750
	
	
As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	in	order	to	construct	the	discrete	choice	
alternatives	in	our	extended	labour	supply	models,	we	need	to	consider	the	relationship	
between	wages	and	job	insecurity.	In	the	data,	for	each	individual	we	observe	a	gross	
hourly	wage	and	a	particular	level	of	job	insecurity.	In	order	to	define	the	wage	rate	
related	to	other	levels	of	job	insecurity,	we	first	impute	wages	by	randomly	assigning	
from	the	wage	distribution	of	individuals	with	the	same	level	of	education	but	which	
are	observed	in	a	different	job	insecurity	group.	In	this	way,	for	each	individual	in	our	
sample	we	obtain	three	gross	hourly	wage	rates	related	to	low,	middle	and	high	job	
insecurity.	The	average	hourly	wages	for	each	level	of	insecurity	are	presented	in	the	
table	3.	We	observe	that	on	average	wages	increase	with	the	level	of	job	insecurity,	
which	is	in	line	with	the	idea	of	compensating	wage	differentials	(see,	Rosen,	1987).		
	
4	The	results	are	robust	for	different	values	of	discrete	hours	of	work	and	job	insecurity.
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Table 3 - Average Gross Hourly Wages by Job Insecurity Level (£ /hour)
 mean std. dev.
Low	job	insecurity	 8.1525	 5.5656
Middle	job	insecurity	 8.1737	 5.1319
High	job	insecurity	 8.2691	 4.8355
	
	
The	gross	hourly	wages	related	to	different	levels	of	job	insecurity	are	then	
constructed	with	respect	to	the	average	gross	hourly	wages	of	the	whole	population.	
Consider	for	 instance	 that	 the	 job	of	 individual	 i	 is	characterised	by	a	gross	hourly	
wage	w
i
	and	a	low	level	of	job	insecurity.	The	gross	hourly	wage	of	individual	i	under	
middle	job	insecurity	will	then	be	given	by	w
i 
+	w
i 
(8.1737−8.15250)/8.1525	and	under	
high	insecurity	by	w
i 
+	w
i 
(8.2691−8.15250)/8.1525.	
Table	 4	 provides	 summary	 statistics	 for	 each	 discrete	 hours	 alternative	
of	 our	 sample	 of	 interest.	As	 previously	mentioned,	 the	 two	main	 groups	 are	 full-
time	 employment	 and	 inactivity.	 Average	 age	 is	 slightly	 higher	 in	 the	 part-time	
and	 overtime	work	 groups.	 The	 inactivity	 group	 presents	 the	 lowest	 percentage	 of	
individuals	with	higher	education.	In	particular,	only	24.26	per	cent	of	the	inactives	
have	higher	education,	compared	to	68.75	per	cent,	in	overtime	work.	Finally,	in	terms	
of	job	insecurity,	the	percentage	of	women	dissatisfied	with	their	job	security	situation	
is	the	highest	for	overtime	jobs.	
	
Table 4 - Discrete Employment Statistics
Hours Share  Higher Net income Job Insecurity
per week (%) Age Education (%) per week (% dissatisfied)
0	 31.33	 36.49	 24.26	 203.4	 -
20	 27.87	 38.92	 39.71	 221.66	 11.96
40	 36.53	 37.67	 56.57	 304.3	 13.87
55	 4.27	 39.13	 68.75	 322.08	 18.75
	
	
5. Estimation of the Labour Supply Models 
This	 section	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 structural	 labour	 supply	 estimation.	 Two	
models	are	estimated	and	compared.	The	first	model	 is	 the	conditional	 logit	model	
traditionally	used	in	the	discrete	choice	literature	to	estimate	labour	supply,	in	which	
only	discrete	hours	alternatives	define	the	choice	set.	The	second	model	consists	of	an	
extension	to	the	basic	conditional	logit	model,	where	the	choice	set	is	now	defined	by	
combinations	of	hours	of	work	and	job	insecurity	and	where	job	insecurity	is	set	to	zero	
for	the	inactives.5	In	both	models,	age,	higher	education	dummies	and	dummies	for	
children	of	different	ages	are	used	as	regressors	to	account	for	observed	heterogeneity	
in	preferences.	Table	5	presents	the	estimated	parameters	for	these	models.	
	
5	A	nested	logit	model	was	also	estimated,	in	which	alternatives	are	grouped	into	two	nests	representing	
inactivity	and	participation.	The	inactivity	nest	contains	a	single	alternative	while	the	participation	
nest	 is	 formed	by	alternatives	characterised	by	bundles	of	hours	of	work	and	 job	 insecurity.	The	
results	obtained	with	the	nested	logit	model	are	similar	to	those	presented	in	the	paper.	
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Table 5 - Estimated Parameters of the Structural Model
  Conditional Logit: Conditional Logit:
  Hours Insecurity
Variable Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error
Income²	 -5.46	 (4.048)	 -6.094	 (4.243)
Income	 12.244***	 (2.121)	 9.992***	 (2.17)
Hours²	 -0.146***	 (0.186)	 -0.548***	 (0.407)
Insecurity²	 -	 -	 0.317***	 (0.031)
Income	2	hours	 -0.941**	 (0.465)	 -0.428	 (0.509)
Income	2	insecurity	 -	 -	 0.062	 (0.283)
Hours	2	insecurity	 -	 -	 0.003	 (0.032)
Hours	 1.013***	 (0.149)	 3.941***	 (0.273)
	 2	age	 -0.087***	 (0.025)	 -0.133***	 (0.031)
	 2	high	edu.	 0.262***	 (0.054)	 0.249***	 (0.064)
	 2	child	0-2	 -0.783***	 (0.146)	 -0.681***	 (0.208)
	 2	child	3-4	 -0.544***	 (0.103)	 -0.567***	 (0.134)
	 2	child	5-11	 -0.326***	 (0.059)	 -0.426***	 (0.073)
	 2		child	12-18	 -0.100*	 (0.058)	 -0.091	 (0.071)
Insecurity	 -	 -	 -3.309***	 (0.258)
	 2	age	 -	 -	 0.067**	 (0.03)
	 2	high	edu.	 -	 -	 -0.008	 (0.054)
	 2	child	0-2	 -	 -	 -0.062	 (0.203)
	 2	child	3-4	 -	 -	 0.078	 (0.122)
	 2	child	5-11	 -	 -	 0.126*	 (0.068)
	 2	child	12-18	 -	 -	 -0.05	 (0.069
Pseudo	R-squared	 0.1308	 0.1772
Notes:	The	main	variables	have	been	rescaled	as	follows:	income/1000;	hours/10;	age/10.	Standard	
errors	in	parentheses.	*p<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001
	
	
In	general	our	results	are	in	line	with	our	expectations	and	coefficients	across	
the	models	estimated	go	in	the	same	direction.	For	both	models,	marginal	utility	of	
income	is	positive	for	over	99	per	cent	of	observations	and	as	the	coefficient	of	income	
square	is	negative,	concavity	in	income	for	the	utility	function	is	respected.	Marginal	
utility	of	hours	of	work	is	negative	for	around	78	per	cent	of	observations	in	the	basic	
labour	supply	model,	while	under	the	extended	model	this	holds	for	a	slightly	lower	
percentage	of	cases,	of	around	70	per	cent.	Turning	to	job	insecurity,	marginal	utility	
is	negative	for	around	90	per	cent	of	observations	in	our	extended	model.	Moreover,	
the	estimated	effects	of	job	insecurity	are	significant,	confirming	the	importance	of	
accounting	for	non-pecuniary	job	attributes	on	labour	supply.	
In	line	with	our	expectations,	single	women	with	young	children	have	lower	
preferences	 for	work	and	 these	 effects	 are	 significant	 in	both	models	 estimated.	 In	
particular,	the	strongest	negative	effect	is	for	women	with	very	young	children	aged	
under	three	years	old.	Similarly,	for	both	the	basic	and	extended	model,	individuals	
with	higher	education	have	higher	preferences	for	work	and	the	interaction	between	
hours	 of	 work	 and	 age	 presents	 a	 negative	 and	 significant	 coefficient.	 Turning	 to	
job	 insecurity,	 we	 remark	 that	 only	 the	 interaction	with	 age	 presents	 a	 significant	
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coefficient,	 with	 preferences	 for	 job	 insecurity	 decreasing	 with	 age.	 Women	 with	
children	aged	less	than	three	years	old	present	lower	preferences	for	job	insecurity,	as	
expected,	however,	the	effect	is	not	significant.	
The	ability	of	our	models	to	fit	the	data	can	be	tested	by	comparing	predicted	and	
observed	frequencies.	Predicted	frequencies	are	obtained	by	averaging	up	individual	
probabilities	for	each	discrete	hours	alternative	over	the	whole	sample,	while	observed	
frequencies	are	simply	the	frequencies	of	each	observed	choice	over	the	whole	sample.	
Table	6	shows	that	 the	basic	conditional	 logit,	where	only	hours	of	work	define	the	
choice	 set,	 performs	 poorly	 in	 terms	 of	 fitting	 the	 data.	 Full-time	 is	 considerably	
underestimated	and	part-time	is	strongly	overestimated.	These	results	are	in	line	with	
the	 literature,	where	such	problems	have	been	 treated	mainly	by	adding	alternative	
specific	 dummies	 (Van	 Soest,	 1995)	 or	 fixed	 costs	 of	work	 (Blundell	 et al.	 2000).	
Here	we	consider	whether	the	additional	information	in	terms	of	job	characteristics	
serves	to	improve	the	predictive	power	of	the	model.	This	seems	to	be	the	case,	as	the	
introduction	of	job	insecurity	into	the	model	improves	considerably	the	fit	of	the	data.	
Additionally,	as	shown	in	table	5,	the	pseudo-R-squared	or	Likelihood	Ratio	Index	of	
McFadden	(1974)	is	higher	for	our	extended	labour	supply	model,	confirming	that	it	
provides	a	better	fit	than	the	basic	model.	
	
Table 6 - Observed vs. Predicted Frequencies
  Predicted
   Conditional logit: Conditional logit:
Alternatives Observed Hours Insecurity
Inactivity	 31.33	 28.19	 32.00
Part-time	 27.87	 37.19	 25.77
Full-time	 36.53	 25.97	 38.93
Overtime	 4.27	 8.66	 3.30
Inactivity	 31.33	 -	 32.00
Part-time
	 low	insecurity	 22.93	 -	 20.11
	 mid.	insecurity	 1.60	 -	 2.28
	 high	insecurity	 3.33	 -	 3.38
Full-time
	 low	insecurity	 29.2	 -	 30.76
	 mid.	insecurity	 2.27	 -	 3.36
	 high	insecurity	 5.07	 -	 4.81
Overtime
	 low	insecurity	 3.33	 -	 2.64
	 mid.	insecurity	 0.13	 -	 0.28
	 high	insecurity	 0.80	 -	 0.38
	
	
The	introduction	of	job	insecurity	as	an	additional	job	attribute	in	the	labour	
supply	model	raises	the	issue	of	omitted	variables	bias.	As	shown	in	the	results,	job	
insecurity	has	a	significant	effect	and	 improves	 the	fit	of	 the	model.	Other	 relevant	
job	 attributes	 could	potentially	 influence	 labour	 supply	decisions	 and	 leaving	 them	
out	could	bias	the	parameter	estimates.	It	is	clear	that	the	extension	of	the	model	is	
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limited	 to	 the	availability	of	 information	 in	 the	data.	 In	our	case,	 the	choice	of	 job	
insecurity	was	not	only	related	to	this	 limitation	but	also	to	the	literature	reporting	
the	importance	of	job	security	as	a	work	domain	(Clark,	2001	and	2010).	Therefore,	
despite	incorporating	only	an	additional	dimension	of	work	into	the	model,	we	consider	
job	insecurity	is	one	of	the	important	dimensions	to	account	for.	In	the	same	line,	in	
terms	of	model	specification,	the	introduction	of	additional	job	attributes	in	the	labour	
supply	model	raises	the	question	of	the	relevance	of	the	assumption	of	independence	
of	irrelevant	alternatives	(IIA),	underlying	the	conditional	logit	model.	In	order	to	test	
the	restriction	imposed	by	the	IIA	assumption,	we	estimated	a	nested	logit	model	for	
both	our	basic	 and	extended	 labour	 supply	models.	Alternatives	were	grouped	 into	
two	nests	representing	inactivity	and	participation.	The	nested	logit	model	partially	
relaxes	the	IIA	assumption	by	allowing	correlation	between	the	choices	inside	each	
nest	(see,	Train,	2003).	The	results	of	the	nested	logit	models	are	similar	to	those	of	the	
conditional	logit	models	presented	in	the	paper.6		
	
6. Labour Supply Elasticities and Responses to Changes 
in Job Insecurity 
The	parameter	 estimates	 obtained	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 can	be	used	 to	 calculate	
labour	supply	elasticities	and	to	analyse	the	effects	of	policy	reforms	on	participation	
and	labour	supply.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	twofold.	First,	wage	elasticities	obtained	
with	our	models	are	compared.	Then,	using	our	extended	model,	we	analyse	the	effect	
of	a	change	in	job	insecurity	on	labour	supply.	
Labour	supply	elasticities	in	discrete	choice	models	are	calculated	numerically	
using	the	estimated	parameters	of	the	utility	function	(see,	Creedy	and	Kalb,	2005).	
First,	we	increase	gross	hourly	wages	by	one	per	cent	and	compute	the	new	disposable	
income	for	each	alternative	using	our	tax	and	benefit	microsimulation	model.	Then,	
with	the	parameters	from	the	utility	function,	obtained	in	the	previous	estimation,	we	
calculate	the	average	simulated	probability	of	being	at	each	alternative	for	both	the	old	
and	the	new	value	of	disposable	income.	These	probabilities	are	then	used	to	compute	
the	expected	value	of	labour	supply	before	and	after	the	wage	increase,	following:	
	
E[h|y,	x]=	∑	Pij hj	
	
Finally,	labour	supply	elasticities	are	computed	numerically	by	dividing	the	
percentage	change	in	expected	labour	supply	by	the	percentage	change	in	wages,	
one	per	 cent	 in	 this	 case.	Table	7	 shows	 the	 elasticities	 derived	 from	our	 labour	
supply	models.		
	
6	Results	are	not	reported	here	but	can	be	made	available	upon	request	from	the	author.
J
j = 1
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Table 7 - Labour Supply Elasticities
 Conditional logit: Conditional Logit:
 Hours Insecurity
Total	 0.126	 0.153*
Low	job	insecurity	 -	 0.141*
Middle	job	insecurity	 -	 0.158*
High	job	insecurity	 -	 0.158*
*significantly	different	than	the	elasticity	of	the	basic	conditional	logit
	
The	calculated	labour	supply	elasticities	are	quite	in	line	with	previous	studies.	
In	fact,	elasticities	for	single	females	are	in	general	between	0	and	0.7	(Bargain	et al.	
2012).	Our	basic	conditional	logit	model	provides	a	labour	supply	elasticity	of	0.126,	
while	 our	 extended	 labour	 supply	model	 provides	 a	 higher	 elasticity	 of	 0.153.	 The	
statistical	significance	of	the	difference	in	elasticities	is	confirmed	using	bootstrapping	
techniques	with	1,000	repetitions.	In	our	extended	conditional	logit	model,	a	further	
distinction	can	be	made	by	calculating	elasticities	for	different	levels	of	job	insecurity.	
Labour	 supply	 elasticities	 are	 lower	 under	 low	 job	 insecurity	 compared	 to	middle	
and	 high	 insecurity.	 This	 result	 suggests	 that	 wage	 increases	 would	 have	 weaker	
effects	for	women	facing	good	conditions	at	work,	in	terms	of	job	security.	However,	
bootstrapping	techniques	show	no	significant	differences	between	elasticities	for	low	
job	insecurity	and	high	job	insecurity.	This	might	be	related	to	the	small	sample	of	
individuals	in	high	insecurity	jobs.	
In	addition	to	the	calculation	of	labour	supply	elasticities,	our	extended	model	
allows	us	to	analyse	the	effect	of	job	insecurity	on	labour	supply.	However,	because	
of	the	qualitative	nature	of	our	job	insecurity	variable,	the	same	methodology	used	to	
calculate	wage	elasticities	cannot	be	applied.	Here	we	simulate	the	effect	of	a	decrease	
of	job	insecurity	by	observing	the	change	in	predicted	probabilities	calculated	by	our	
model.	We	decrease	levels	of	job	insecurity	by	the	equivalent	of	one	standard	deviation	
of	job	insecurity	(std.	dev.	1.392)	for	individuals	with	middle	and	high	insecurity.	Table	
8	presents	the	predicted	probabilities	calculated	with	our	model	before	and	after	the	
decrease	in	job	insecurity.	
	
Table 8 - The Effect of a Decrease in Job Insecurity
 Predicted Probabilities
 Conditional Logit: Insecurity
 Before After
Inactivity	 32.00	 29.52
Part-time	 25.77	 27.02
Full-time	 38.93	 40.09
Overtime	 3.30	 3.37
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Our	 results	 show	 that	 a	 decrease	 in	 job	 insecurity	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	
participation.	In	fact,	the	probability	of	inactivity	decreases	by	around	2.5	percentage	
points.	 All	working	 alternatives	 present	 an	 increase,	 the	most	 important	 being	 for	
part-time	and	full-time	employment.	This	result	is	particularly	interesting	in	terms	of	
policy	because	objectives	aimed	at	providing	incentives	for	participation	could	also	
be	achieved	through	the	channel	of	improving	non-pecuniary	job	attributes,	and	not	
only	through	monetary	incentives.	In	order	to	have	an	idea	of	the	magnitude	that	the	
decrease	 in	 inactivity	 represents,	we	calculated	 the	 increase	 in	overall	gross	wages	
necessary	to	obtain	an	equivalent	decrease	in	inactivity.	An	increase	in	overall	gross	
wages	of	around	20	per	cent	would	be	needed	in	order	to	obtain	a	similar	decrease	in	
the	probability	of	inactivity.		
These	results	provide	an	interesting	insight	into	the	effect	of	non-pecuniary	
job	 attributes	 on	 labour	 supply,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 remark	 that	 this	 labour	
supply	model	does	not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 reaction	of	firms	 to	policies	 aimed	at	
improving	working	conditions.	In	fact,	from	the	demand	side,	providing	better	working	
conditions	might	 represent	 additional	 costs	which	could	be	 linked	 to	a	decrease	 in	
wages.	This	would	result	in	a	negative	effect	of	labour	supply	and	therefore	the	total	
effect	would	be	ambiguous.	The	incorporation	of	labour	demand	within	our	setting	
represents,	in	this	sense,	an	important	step	for	future	research.	
7. Conclusion 
The	aim	of	this	paper	was	to	provide	an	insight	into	the	effect	of	non-pecuniary	job	
attributes	 on	 labour	 supply.	 Two	 models	 were	 estimated	 and	 compared.	 First,	 we	
estimated	a	conditional	logit	model	where	the	choice	set	is	defined	only	in	terms	of	
discrete	hours	alternatives.	This	is	the	approach	most	widely	used	to	estimate	discrete	
choice	labour	supply.	Then,	we	proposed	an	extension	to	the	model	in	which	the	choice	
set	is	characterised	by	bundles	of	income,	hours	of	work	and	job	characteristics;	job	
insecurity	in	our	case.	The	estimation	of	these	structural	labour	supply	models	was	
done	using	maximum	likelihood.	
Different	observations	can	be	drawn	from	our	results.	First	of	all,	as	expected,	
job	insecurity	has	a	negative	effect	on	individuals’	utility,	with	a	calculated	marginal	
utility	 which	 is	 negative	 for	 around	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 observations.	 Second,	 the	
predictive	power	of	the	model	improves	considerably	when	job	insecurity	is	included	
as	 an	 attribute	 of	 choice,	 compared	 to	 the	 basic	 conditional	 logit	 model	 without	
alternative	specific	dummies	or	fixed	costs	of	work.	Third,	labour	supply	elasticities	
calculated	 with	 the	 extended	 labour	 supply	 model	 are	 higher	 than	 those	 of	 the	
traditional	 conditional	 logit	model	 and	 these	 differences	 are	 significant.	Moreover,	
wage	elasticities	for	women	working	under	low	job	insecurity	are	lower	than	those	of	
females	in	middle	and	high	insecurity	jobs	implying	that	individuals	working	under	
good	job	security	conditions	would	respond	less	to	wage	changes.	Finally,	our	results	
contribute	to	the	literature	on	the	effects	of	job	insecurity,	showing	that	a	decrease	of	
job	insecurity	decreases	the	probability	of	inactivity	by	around	2.5	percentage	points.	
This	result	is	particularly	interesting	as	it	suggests	that	policies	aimed	at	improving	
working	conditions	could	be	used	to	create	incentives	for	labour	market	participation.	
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An	 important	aspect	behind	our	 results	 is	 the	use	of	 self-reported	working	
conditions,	in	our	case	self-perceived	job	insecurity.	This	is	the	type	of	information	
available	in	most	household	surveys.	While	perceived	job	insecurity	has	been	shown	
to	be	associated	with	objective	indicators	of	insecure	jobs,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	
mind	that	a	subjective	component	characterises	such	measures.	In	particular,	it	could	
be	the	case,	for	some	individuals,	that	an	improvement	in	objective	job	security	factors	
would	not	be	reflected	in	a	better	subjective	perception	of	job	security.	For	this	reason,	
the	findings	 obtained	 in	 this	 study	 should	be	 contrasted	with	 future	 analysis	 using	
objective	measures	of	working	conditions.	In	the	case	of	job	insecurity,	for	instance,	an	
indicator	of	objective	insecurity	could	be	constructed	based	on	information	concerning	
temporary	employment,	sector	of	work,	presence	of	job	security	guarantees	at	the	firm	
level	(available	from	linked	employer-employee	data),	among	others.	
To	 conclude,	 we	 believe	 that	 the	 incorporation	 of	 working	 conditions	 in	
the	 analysis	 of	 labour	 supply	 offers	 potential	 opportunities	 for	 future	 research.	 In	
particular,	 multiple	 factors	 characterise	 jobs	 therefore	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	
the	main	 attributes	 influencing	 labour	market	 participation	 could	 be	 useful	 from	 a	
policy	 perspective.	Moreover,	 it	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 consider	 to	which	 extent	 (if	
any)	 incorporating	 job	attributes	 in	behavioural	microsimulation	models	affects	ex-
ante	evaluations	of	policy	reforms.	Finally,	from	a	methodological	point	of	view,	the	
incorporation	of	additional	job	attributes	highlights	the	importance	of	accounting	for	
possible	correlations	between	wages	and	job	characteristics	as	part	of	the	analysis	of	
labour	supply.	
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